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THE RULE OF LAW IS THE RULE OF REASON 
BRIAN WINROW† J.D. AND KEVIN JOHNSON†† J.D. 
ABSTRACT 
Since the enactment of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, businesses 
have been prohibited from implementing both vertical and horizontal 
restraints.  Such restraints are construed as against public policy in a 
democracy, and were traditionally invalidated under a per se analysis.  The 
result has been to thwart smaller scale manufacturers from competing with 
larger manufacturers.  In a recent August 2007 decision, the United States 
Supreme Court has shown a willingness to permit vertical restraints by 
changing the level of judicial scrutiny from the rigid per se violation to the 
more subjective and flexible rule of reason. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
For the past decade, the United States Supreme Court has vigorously 
prohibited the use of price maintenance agreements on the basis that they 
are conducive to cartels and are predisposed to exhibit anticompetitive 
effects.1  As a result, the United States Supreme Court has imposed a per se 
prohibition on price maintenance agreements, resulting in a complete bar on 
any price restraints, without looking at the subjective facts of the alleged 
price maintenance agreement.2 
On June 28, 2007 the United States Supreme Court’s decision in 
Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.3 abolished a ninety-six 
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1. See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 407 (1911) (holding 
that price fixing is injurious to the consumer, as these types of arrangements destroy competition). 
2. Id. at 408.  The specific advantages derived from the agreement, derived from the 
enhanced price, will not be considered when faced with a price fixing agreement.  Id. 
3. 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007). 
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year-old prohibition of vertical minimum pricing agreements between 
manufacturers and retailers.4  The decision reflected an emerging trend 
within the United States Supreme Court to permit courts to look 
subjectively at alleged vertical agreements, as opposed to the rigid per se 
violation.5  As a result, the courts have replaced the per se standard with the 
more flexible rule of reason to determine whether the agreement has 
anticompetitive effects.6 
Part II of this article will begin by providing a brief history and legal 
background of this area.  This will include an explanation of the Sherman 
Antitrust Act,7 which is the basis for prohibiting anticompetitive behavior.  
This article will explain the purview of the Sherman Act and describe the 
two different standards available to the courts when faced with an alleged 
restraint in violation of the Sherman Act.  Part II will conclude with a com-
parison and contrast of vertical and horizontal price maintenance agree-
ments to ascertain the anticompetitive and/or procompetitive effects that 
result from the respective price maintenance agreements. 
Part III of this article will discuss both the majority and dissenting 
opinion in the 5-4 holding of Leegin.  Part IV will address the practical 
ramifications for practitioners as well as the factors a practitioner should 
consider when incorporating a vertical price maintenance agreement.  Final-
ly, a summary of the new standard of review in Part V will conclude the 
article. 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
This section will discuss the scope of the Sherman Antitrust Act with 
an emphasis on Section One of the Act, which prohibits unreasonable 
restraints on trade.  This section will then discuss the two possible standards 
by which an alleged restraint will be adjudged: the per se violation and the 
rule of reason.  Section II will conclude by discussing horizontal and 
vertical price restraints, both of which have the potential to unreasonably 
restrain trade, thus violating Section One of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 
 
4. Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2725. 
5. See Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (distinguishing between joint ventures 
and competitors, whereas joint ventures involve price setting as opposed to price fixing and are 
thus analyzed under the rule of reason); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (holding that 
vertical price fixing agreements do not meet the criteria to be rejected as a per se violation); 
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984) (providing a holding 
that is not contingent upon the organizational structure of the subsidiary); Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE 
Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977) (using the rule of reason in vertical geographical restraints 
in lieu of the traditional per se analysis). 
6. Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2720. 
7. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890). 
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A. THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT 
The Sherman Antitrust Act was passed in 1890 to protect trade and 
commerce against unlawful restraints,8 and has been a powerful weapon in 
allowing the government to regulate commerce and to promote a procom-
petitive economy.9  The Sherman Act serves as a consumer protection tool, 
as it prohibits any restraint that adversely affects the consumer.10  It is 
comprised of two major provisions, which are instrumental in facilitating a 
competitive economy.  The first provision, Section One of the Sherman 
Act, provides that “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or 
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the 
several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal.”11  
Section Two of the Sherman Act prohibits monopolies.12  While Section 
Two is a major provision, it falls outside the scope of this article. 
Section One prohibits unreasonable vertical and horizontal restraints, 
which adversely affect consumers.13  Horizontal restraints are agreements 
between competitors that put restraints on commerce.14  In contrast, vertical 
restraints are restraints enacted by a manufacturer to a buyer.15  While Sec-
tion One prohibits “every contract . . . in restraint of trade,” courts have not 
strictly interpreted the legislative language.16  Instead, courts have held that 
the legislative intent of Section One of the Sherman Act was to prohibit 
unreasonable restraints of trade.17 
B. STANDARDS FOR EVALUATING RESTRAINTS OF TRADE 
Courts have determined that there are two standards for evaluating the 
reasonableness of trade restraints.18  The reasonableness of the restraint will 
be decided by either the rule of reason or the per se violation.19  The nature 
 
8. Id. 
9. See Hammes v. AAMCO Transmissions, 33 F.3d 774, 779 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that 
there are very few antitrust cases falling outside the scope of the commerce clause). 
10. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890). 
11. Id. 
12. Id. § 2. 
13. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997). 
14. Spectators’ Comm’n Network, Inc. v. Colonial Country Club, 231 F.3d 1005, 1013 (5th 
Cir. 2000). 
15. Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 724-25 (1988) (citing GTE 
Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 36, 52 n.19). 
16. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1997); Khan, 522 U.S. at 10. 
17. Khan, 522 U.S. at 10. 
18. Id. 
19. Denny’s Marina Inc. v. Renfro Prods. Inc., 8 F.3d 1217, 1220 (7th Cir. 1993). 
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of the restraint determines which standard will be applied to the alleged 
violation.20 
1. Rule of Reason 
The general standard, applied to alleged violations of Section One of 
the Sherman Act, is adjudged under the rule of reason.21  This standard was 
adopted in Standard Oil Co. v. United States.22  The United States Supreme 
Court adopted the rule of reason criteria, as it reflected the spirit of the 
Sherman Act to prohibit all contracts that unreasonably restrain trade.23  
Under the rule of reason, the Court utilized a balancing test, whereby each 
factor would be afforded weight to ascertain whether a restrictive practice 
imposes an unreasonable restraint on competition.24  The key in this 
analysis was to determine whether the contract under scrutiny had an 
interbrand in intrabrand effect.25  The rule of reason is thus decided on a 
case by case basis.26  In determining whether the restraint is reasonable, the 
United States Supreme Court has enumerated several factors that should be 
incorporated within the balancing test.27  The factors include: (1) specific 
information about the business; (2) the history, nature, and effect of the 
restraint; (3) the applicable market power of both the manufacturer and the 
distributor; and (4) the reason for the restraints.28 
The first two factors analyze the specific information about the busi-
ness, in conjunction with the history, nature, and effect of the restraint.  The 
combinations of these factors are analyzed to ascertain whether the restraint 
imposed by the business regulates or suppresses competition.29  If the 
restraint is regulatory in nature, it has the possibility of promoting competi-
tion.  When courts evaluate these factors, they look at the condition of the 
business before and after the restraint, as well as the effect of the restraint.30 
The third factor involves the market power of both the manufacturer 
and the distributor.  This factor protects against the possibility of forming a 
cartel, which would violate the Sherman Act.  If numerous manufacturers, 
who each possess a significant amount of market power, engage in a resale 
 
20. Id. 
21. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2712 (2007). 
22. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 66 (1911). 
23. Id. 
24. Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977). 
25. Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2718. 
26. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 49. 
27. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. 
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price maintenance agreement, the agreement can deprive consumers of the 
option of selecting between high-service and low-price outlets.31  As a 
result, resale price maintenance agreements that involve manufacturers or 
retailers with a significant amount of market power, possess a heightened 
risk.32 In this situation, the resale price maintenance agreement is closely 
scrutinized.33 
In contrast, when only a few manufacturers who lack market power 
enter into price maintenance agreements, it is unlikely that they will 
facilitate a manufacturer’s cartel, as they may be undercut by competitors.34 
Moreover, a retailer cartel is unlikely to occur when a single manufacturer 
in a competitive market imposes a price maintenance agreement.35  In this 
situation, interbrand competition would redirect consumers to lower priced 
substitute goods, thus minimizing any benefit derived from entering into a 
resale price maintenance agreement. 
The fourth factor inquires into the reason for the resale price mainte-
nance agreement.36  In determining the purpose of the agreement, courts 
will inquire into the reason for adopting the remedy as well as the end 
sought to be obtained.37  Good intentions, however, will not validate an 
objectionable restraint, but will assist the court in construing or predicting 
the consequences of the restraint.38 
The rule of reason is a flexible test that permits the court to analyze the 
subjective practices of the business in conjunction with the effects of the 
questionable business agreement.39  If the business agreement has an 
anticompetitive effect, the agreement will be invalidated under the Sherman 
Act.40  While the rule of reason is the general standard, some agreements 
are of the type that, if there is a strong probability that the agreement will 
have an anticompetitive effect, the agreement is per se illegal.41 
 
31. Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2719. 
32. Id. at 2720. 
33. Id. 
34. See id. at 2720 (citing Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 727 (1988)) 
(“Retail market power is rare, because of the usual presence of interbrand competition and other 
dealers.”). 
35. Id. 
36. Chicago Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238.  The courts must ascertain whether the agreement 
merely regulates or suppresses competition.  Id. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (citing Chicago Bd. of Trade v. 
U.S., 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918)). 
40. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2713 (2007) 
(holding that the per se analysis is confined to restraints that are substantially certain to thwart 
competition). 
41. Id. 
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2. Per Se Violation 
A per se violation is issued when the type of restraint has previously 
been scrutinized by the courts and has consistently been determined to 
violate Section One of the Sherman Act.42  A series of disallowed agree-
ments will change the scrutiny of that type of agreement from the rule of 
reason to the per se standard.43  When this occurs, such agreements are 
presumed to violate Section One of the Sherman Act.44  Until the per se 
standard applies, however, the rule of reason is applied.45  Accordingly, the 
per se rule is appropriate only after courts have had considerable experience 
with the type of restraint at issue and can predict with confidence that the 
practice would be invalidated in almost all instances under the rule of 
reason.  For example, the per se violation standard is used in cases that 
involve predatory pricing, as well as horizontal customer division 
agreements such as price fixing, group boycotts, and tying arrangements.46  
In other words, the contract is deemed illegal per se without requiring a 
showing of the actual or likely impact on a market.47 
The purpose of using the per se standard is twofold.48  First, it pro-
motes judicial efficiency by allowing the court to use a strict standard and 
avoid lengthy litigation on facts that have an extremely high probability of 
violating the Sherman Act.49  While this factor is considered, administrative 
efficiency in itself is insufficient to justify a per se violation.50  Secondly, 
the per se standard provides consistency within the law. As a result, prac-
titioners are able to advise their clients as to permissible conduct, or 
conduct that has a substantial likelihood to violate the Sherman Act. 
C. TYPES OF RESTRAINTS 
In order for a restraint to violate Section One of the Sherman Act, there 
must be an agreement between at least two parties.  The agreement will 
either be classified as a horizontal or vertical restraint.  A horizontal 
restraint occurs when members at the same level of the supply chain enter 
 
42. Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988). 
43. Id. at 724.  The per se analysis is used when the likelihood of anticompetitive effects are 
substantially certain.  Id. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 723. 
46. United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 357 n.5 (1967) (citing N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. 
United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)). 
47. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940). 
48. Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 (1977). 
49. Id. at 49-50. 
50. Id. at 50 n.16. 
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into an agreement that restricts competition.  In contrast, a vertical restraint 
occurs when two or more parties at different market levels, such as a 
manufacturer and distributor, enter into an agreement relating to price or 
geographical boundaries. 
1. Horizontal Restraints 
A horizontal restraint is an agreement that in some way restrains 
competition between competitors at the same market level.51  The compet-
itors are at the same market level if they are similarly situated on the 
distribution chain.52  A common example occurs when two retailers agree to 
establish a minimum price at which to sell a product or service.53  In cases 
involving the allegation of horizontal restraints, the courts will use the more 
stringent per se standard to thwart out violations of the Sherman Act.54  The 
courts use the exception to the rule of reason, as horizontal restraints are 
indicative of anticompetitive behavior and are consistent with conditions 
conducive to a cartel.55  The United States Supreme Court emphasized the 
inherent dangers associated with such agreements in relation to free compe-
tition in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.56  The Supreme Court 
held that reasonableness of the agreement was insufficient as a defense.57  
The two most prevalent types of horizontal restraints include price fixing 
and market division.58 
a. Price Fixing 
Price fixing occurs when competitors at the same level of the market 
structure agree to set a certain price for a product, and thus diminish the 
nature of competition for a given product.59  However, an agreement upon a 
set price is not necessary.60  Price fixing may also arise if the range in 
which purchases or sales will be made is agreed upon by competitors.61  
 
51. Crane & Shovel Sales Corp. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 854 F.2d 802, 805 (6th Cir. 1988). 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
54. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2713 (2007) (citing 
Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006); Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49-50 
(1990)). 
55. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221-22 (1940). 
56. 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940). 
57. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at 222-23. 
58. ROGER LEROY MILLER & GAYLORD A. JENTZ, BUSINESS LAW TODAY COMPREHENSIVE 
970-71 (7th ed. 2007). 
59. Denny’s Marina, Inc. v. Renfro Prods., 8 F.3d 1217, 1220-21 (7th Cir. 1993). 
60. Id. at 1221.   
61. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at 222. 
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This is construed to be price fixing, since the competitors agree upon the 
pricing technique.62  Moreover, whether the agreed upon price is reasonable 
based upon market factors is immaterial.63  As a result, horizontal price 
fixing is evaluated under the per se standard, thus eliminating the requisite 
showing of an actual or likely impact on the market.64  This type of agree-
ment is scrutinized under the per se standard because the joint action by 
competitors to engage in price fixing has the requisite “substantial” 
potential for an impact on competition.65  The per se standard is the appro-
priate standard, as horizontal price fixing agreements have manifestly 
anticompetitive effects and lack any redeeming virtue.  Furthermore, these 
agreements almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease 
output.66  As a result, they do not warrant a subjective analysis of the effect 
of the actual restriction.67 
In Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales,68 the Supreme Court addressed this 
issue.69  In Catalano, a certified class of beer retailers brought suit against 
wholesalers, claiming that they conspired to eliminate short-term trade 
credit.70  Prior to the agreement, manufacturers extended credit to retailers 
without interest for the amount of time permitted by California state law.71 
During this time, wholesalers competed with respect to trade credit, and the 
terms afforded to the individual retailers varied.72  After the agreement, the 
manufacturers uniformly refused to extend any credit.73 
In its holding, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged that 
price fixing is a per se violation of the Sherman Act and that it is immaterial 
as to the reasonableness of the fixed price.74  The Supreme Court further 
held that an agreement to cease the practice of extending credit is tanta-
mount to an agreement abolishing discounts, and is thus a per se violation 
of the Sherman Act.75  As a result, credit terms are characterized as an 
inseparable part of the price.76 
 
62. Id. 
63. Id. at 223. 
64. Id. at 223-24. 
65. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16 (1984). 
66. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2713 (2007). 
67. Id. 
68. 446 U.S. 643 (1980). 
69. Catalano, 446 U.S. at 644. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 645. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. at 647. 
75. Id. at 648. 
76. Id. 
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b. Market divisions 
In addition to horizontal price fixing, the Sherman Act prohibits 
horizontal market divisions whereby competitors divide up territories.77  
The territories are often divided based upon geographical location.78  In 
dividing up the territory, the competitors agree to refrain from competing 
with one another within their respective territories.79  The rationale behind 
prohibiting such market divisions is that the actions permit competitors to 
increase the price to consumers within their jurisdiction by minimizing the 
competition.80  This type of collusion between competitors almost always 
results in an anticompetitive effect.81 
Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc.82 addressed the issue of market 
division.83  In Palmer, two competing providers of bar review courses, a 
Georgia corporation and a Delaware corporation, entered into an agreement.  
The agreement stated that the Delaware corporation would not compete 
with the Georgia corporation in the state of Georgia, and the Georgia corpo-
ration would pay certain fees to the Delaware corporation and would not 
compete outside the state of Georgia.84  After entering into the agreement, 
the Georgia corporation nearly tripled the cost of the bar review service.85 
The United States Supreme Court held that horizontal territorial restric-
tions are naked restraints of trade with the sole purpose of stifling competi-
tion.86  As such, these agreements are per se violations of the Sherman 
Act.87  The court further held that whether the parties split a market that 
they are both competing in, or whether they merely reserve their respective 
markets, is immaterial.88 
2. Vertical Restraints 
While horizontal restraints involve competitors at the same level of the 
market structure, vertical restraints are agreements or restrictions between 
 
77. United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 357 (1967) (citing Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. 
United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1958)). 
78. Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49 (1990) (citing United States v. Topco 
Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 604 (1972)). 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. 498 U.S. 46 (1990). 
83. Palmer, 498 U.S. at 46. 
84. Id. at 47, 49. 
85. Id. at 47. 
86. Id. at 49 (citing U.S. v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972)). 
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
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parties at different levels of the market structure, such as a manufacturer of 
a product and the distributor.89  The most common forms of vertical 
restraints include (1) territorial and customer restrictions common within 
franchising agreements, and (2) retail price maintenance agreements.90 
a. Territorial and Customer Restrictions 
Territorial and customer restrictions occur when manufacturers insulate 
distributors from direct competition with other distributors.91  In order to 
accomplish this objective, the manufacturer may implement territorial 
restrictions or prohibit the resale of products to certain classes of buyers, 
such as other retailers.92  Traditionally, manufacturers were prohibited from 
incorporating territorial or customer restrictions into their dealings with 
distributors.93  These vertical restraints received the same per se standard 
utilized within horizontal restraints.94  As a result, vertical territorial or 
customer restrictions were prohibited.95 
United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co.96 is the leading case prohibiting 
vertical territorial and customer restrictions.97  The Schwinn company 
implemented a strategy to sell to specific distributors and retailers by 
consignment or credit.98  Schwinn would assign territories to its wholesale 
distributors and restrict the distributor’s sales to franchised dealers within 
the allocated territory.99  The allocation of territories was challenged by the 
government as a possible violation of the Sherman Act.100  The United 
States Supreme Court distinguished between territorial restrictions when the 
distributor/retailer purchased the items for resale, as opposed to when the 
manufacturer retained title.101  When the manufacturer retained title to the 
product, the restraint was analyzed under the rule of reason, as the 
manufacturer retained the risk of loss.102  Now, when the distributor/retailer 
purchases the product, the manufacturer relinquishes title, dominion and 
 
89. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 267 (1967) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
90. MILLER & JENTZ, supra note 58, at 972-73. 
91.  State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 11 (1997) (citing United States v. Arnold Schwinn & 
Co., 388 U.S. 365, 379 (1967)). 
92. White Motor Co., 372 U.S. at 254. 
93. Arnold Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. at 382. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
96. 388 U.S. 365 (1967). 
97. Arnold Schwinn & Co., 372 U.S. at 367. 
98. Id. at 369. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. at 369-70. 
101. Id. at 380. 
102. Id. at 381. 
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risk.103 Any effort thereafter to restrict territory or persons to whom the 
product may be transferred is deemed a per se violation of the Sherman 
Act.104 
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.105 involved a contest of the 
per se standard in relation to the vertical territorial or customer restric-
tions.106  In that case, Continental, a retailer, filed suit against GTE 
Sylvania, a manufacturer, claiming that the geographical limitations 
imposed by GTE Sylvania violated Section One of the Sherman Act.107  
The United States Supreme Court held that vertical restraints can be used to 
induce retailers to offer services necessary to the efficient marketing of the 
manufacturer’s product.108  The Supreme Court further held that the 
enhanced services may not otherwise be provided by the retailer as a 
consequence of market imperfections, which include the “free rider” 
effect.109 Free riding occurs when discount retailers capitalize upon the 
marketing and promotional efforts of others to create demand.110  The 
discount retailer is able to avoid the marketing expenses associated with the 
promotional strategy, enabling the discounter to resell the item at a 
discounted price.111 
As a result, the United States Supreme Court held that nonprice vertical 
restraints are not by nature anticompetitive, and thus overruled Arnold 
Schwinn & Co.112  Under Continental T.V., territorial and customer restric-
tions were analyzed under the rule of reason standard.113 
b. Price Maintenance Agreements 
Vertical price maintenance agreements are arrangements between the 
manufacturer and distributor as to the price of a product.114  The agreements 
are classified as either maximum or minimum retail price maintenance 
agreements.115 
 
103. Id. 
104. Id. 
105. 694 F.2d 1132 (9th Cir. 1982). 
106. Cont’l T.V., 694 F.2d at 1135. 
107. Id. at 1134. 
108. Id. at 1136 (citing Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55 (1977)). 
109. Id. at 1137 (citing GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 55). 
110. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2715 (2007). 
111. Id. 
112. Cont’l T.V., 694 F.2d at 1135.  
113. Id. 
114. AAA Liquors, Inc. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 705 F.2d 1203, 1205 (10th Cir. 
1982). 
115.  State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 12 (1997). 
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3. Maximum Price Maintenance Agreements 
Vertical maximum price maintenance agreements are agreements 
between parties at different levels of the market structure that establish a 
ceiling as to the maximum price charged for a product.116  As held in 
Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc.,117 prior to 1997 
maximum price maintenance agreements were analyzed under the per se 
standard.118  In that case, Kiefer-Stewart Co., a wholesaler of liquor, alleged 
that Seagram and Calvert only sold liquor to wholesalers who agreed not to 
sell the product above the fixed price.  The United States Supreme Court 
held that business practices, formed for the purpose and with the effect of 
raising, depressing, fixing, or stabilizing the price of a product, are illegal 
per se.119 
The justification for using the per se standard was twofold.  First, there 
was a possibility that vertical maximum price agreements could facilitate 
discrimination against certain dealers, by channeling distribution through 
advantaged dealers and shielding them from nonprice competition.121  The 
second concern was that the agreement could restrict the services that 
dealers could afford to offer customers, or effectively serve as a minimum 
price fixing scheme.122  This situation occurs when the selling price for the 
product is almost always at the level of the fixed maximum price.123  When 
this occurs, the distributor will have incentive to forgo costly services such 
as promotional activities in order to reduce the overhead associated with 
selling the product. 
In 1997, the United States Supreme Court held that the primary pur-
pose of the antitrust laws was to protect interbrand competition in State Oil 
Co. v. Khan.124  The Court acknowledged that the invalidation of businesses 
practices that result in lower prices to the consumer is counterintuitive, as 
reducing prices in order to increase the business market share is often the 
very essence of competition.125  Moreover, the court held that low prices 
benefit consumers, and as long as the maximum price agreements do not 
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rise to predatory levels, they do not threaten competition.126  As a result, the 
court held that vertically imposed maximum prices did not possess the 
requisite likelihood to warrant a per se invalidation.127  The holding permits 
manufacturers to impose maximum resale price maintenance agreements, 
which are subsequently judged against the more flexible rule of reason 
standard.128  Since this landmark holding, lower courts have adhered to the 
ruling per stare decisis.129  The lower courts, however, have reiterated that 
while Khan changes the standard by which the maximum price maintenance 
agreements are adjudged, it does not stand for the proposition that maxi-
mum resale price maintenance schemes are presumptively lawful.130  Khan 
merely permits the trial to take additional factors into consideration, in de-
ciding whether the maximum price maintenance agreement violates Section 
One of the Sherman Act.131 
4. Minimum Price Maintenance Agreements 
Even while the standard applied to most vertical restraints shifted from 
the per se standard to the more flexible rule of reason, courts continued to 
hold steadfast against minimum price maintenance agreements that applied 
the per se standard.  These courts distinguished minimum price mainte-
nance agreements from the other vertical restraints.132  A minimum price 
maintenance agreement occurs when a manufacturer establishes a price 
floor at which distributors or retailers may sell the product.133 
Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.134 prohibited the 
use of minimum price maintenance agreements.135  In that case, Dr. Miles 
Medical Company manufactured proprietary medicines.136  The medicines 
were sold to select wholesalers, who in turn sold the product to retailers, for 
sale to the consumer.137  Dr. Miles Medical Company not only established a 
minimum resale price that the wholesaler could charge to the retailer, but 
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also a minimum price that the retailer could charge to the consumer.138  
Some of the retailers violated the agreement and set lower prices.  Dr. Miles 
Medical Company filed suit to prohibit this practice and enforce the mini-
mum price maintenance agreement.139  The United States Supreme Court 
dismissed the complaint and held that a manufacturer could not set prices 
for future sales, and that minimum price maintenance agreements would per 
se violate the Sherman Act.140 
5. Court’s Analysis of Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. 
PSKS, Inc. 
On August 14th, 2007, the United States Supreme Court took a 
proactive stance in Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS Inc., 
stating that the minimum resale price maintenance agreements should fall 
under the purview of the law of reason, as opposed to the per se standard 
previously articulated under Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 
Co.141  The decision reversed a significant amount of established case law 
that had been designed to prohibit minimum price maintenance agreements. 
Leegin will be analyzed in the following section.  The analysis will 
consist of the material facts giving rise to the decision, as well as the proce-
dural history of the case.  This article will then provide an in-depth analysis 
of the majority’s opinion, which changed the standard from a per se viola-
tion to the rule of reason.  This section will conclude with an analysis of the 
dissenting opinion. 
a. Facts 
In 1997, the Leegin company instituted a policy whereby it refused to 
sell to retailers that discounted their products below the suggested prices.142  
The purpose of this policy was to promote superior customer service, which 
Leegin believed was lacking with most discounting conglomerates.143  In 
return, Leegin set a minimum price to ensure that retailers received 
sufficient margins on Leegin products, allowing them to provide superior 
quality customer service consistent with the distribution strategy, and main-
taining a high quality brand image.144  PSKS was a retailer that sold Leegin 
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products.145  PSKS began discounting the product in violation of the mini-
mum price maintenance agreement.146  In response, Leegin discontinued 
distributing to the retailer, and PSKS lost a significant amount of busi-
ness.147  PSKS filed suit, attempting to invalidate the minimum price main-
tenance under the per se standard.148 
b. Procedural History 
The United States District Court held that the minimum price main-
tenance pricing policy was a per se violation of the Sherman Act, and thus 
refused to take into consideration expert testimony regarding the procom-
petitive effects of the agreement.149  The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit affirmed the holding.150  The United States Supreme Court 
granted certiorari and reversed the District Court and Court of Appeals, 
with a 5-4 opinion, changing the standard from the per se violation to an 
analysis under the rule of reason.151 
c. Majority’s Opinion 
The key in the Supreme Court’s analysis under the rule of reason was 
to determine whether the contract, under scrutiny, had a procompetitive or 
anticompetitive effect.152  In Leegin, the Supreme Court held that it was 
essentially undisputed that minimum resale price maintenance agreements 
would have procompetitive effects.153  Furthermore, under numerous mar-
ket conditions, a minimum price contract would unlikely have anticompet-
itive effects.154  In addition, the Supreme Court held that there was a 
pervasive consensus that permitting a manufacturer to control the price at 
which its goods are sold would promote interbrand competition in a variety 
of ways.155  Finally, recent studies documenting the competitive effects of 
resale price maintenance support the position that this practice neglects to 
 
145. Id. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. at 2712. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. at 2717. 
153. Id. at 2721. 
154. Id. at 2715. 
155. Id. (citing ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS OF 
PRODUCT DISTRIBUTION 76 (2006)). 
       
74 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 84:59 
meet the criteria for a per se rule.156  As previously stated, the primary 
purpose of the antitrust laws is to protect interbrand competition.157 
The primary advantage of minimum resale price maintenance 
agreements is that they have the ability to stimulate interbrand competi-
tion.158  Interbrand competition is defined as competition among manufac-
turers selling different brands of the same type of product.159  This occurs 
by reducing intrabrand competition, the competition between retailers 
selling the same brand.160  The facilitation of interbrand competition is 
desirable, as it coincides with the spirit of antitrust regulations to foster and 
protect interbrand competition.161 
The Supreme Court held that when a single manufacturer implements 
vertical price restraints, interbrand competition is promoted in three ways.  
First, minimum resale price maintenance agreements minimize intrabrand 
price competition.162  By reducing or eliminating intrabrand competition, 
retailers are encouraged to invest in services or promotional efforts that aid 
the manufacturer’s position as against rival manufacturers.163  The Supreme 
Court further noted that if intrabrand competition exists, retailers have a 
disincentive to make such investments for fear that a discounting retailer 
could “free ride” on the value and increase in demand derived from the 
investment of the initial retailers, who allocate significant time and 
resources in creating the demand for the product.164  Free riding occurs 
when discount retailers capitalize upon the marketing and promotional 
efforts of others to create the demand.165  The discount retailer is able to 
avoid the marketing expenses associated with the increase in demand, and 
then may resell the item at a discounted price.166  If the consumer has the 
option of purchasing the product from a retailer that discounts because it 
has not invested the capital to provide services or develop a quality 
reputation, the high-service retailer will lose sales to the discounter.167  As a 
result, the high service retailer will be forced to restrict services to a level 
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lower than consumers would prefer in order to compete with the 
discounter.168  The minimum resale price maintenance agreement alleviates 
the problem, as it prevents the discounter from undercutting the service 
provider.  Retailers are then able to compete among themselves over 
services.169 
A second advantage of the minimum resale price maintenance agree-
ment is that it facilitates interbrand competition by encouraging market 
entry for new firms and brands.170  New manufacturers can use the 
restrictions to entice competent and aggressive retailers and distributors to 
make the requisite investment that is often required in the distribution of 
products unknown to the consumer.171  This occurs as the distributor is 
ensured a sufficient profit margin to warrant such an infusion of capital.172  
The minimum price maintenance agreement assures the distributor and/or 
retailer that they will not be undercut by a free rider, who capitalizes on the 
capital expenditure and marketing efforts of the distributor.173  This serves 
as an incentive for distributors to aggressively promote a manufacturer’s 
product, and to compete based upon marketing efforts and customer 
service, as opposed to price.174  The result is a procompetitive effect, which 
occurs when markets are penetrated by using resale price maintenance 
agreements. 
Finally, the resale price maintenance contract can increase interbrand 
competition by offering the retailer a guaranteed margin and threatening 
termination of the contract if the retailer fails to meet or exceed 
expectations.175  Such action induces the performance of the retailer, and 
thus increases the manufacturer’s market share.176  This occurs as smaller 
distributors and retailers are able to maintain a competitive price without 
regard to the economies of scale, and can provide a competitive advantage 
through superior customer service and marketing.177 
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d. Dissenting Opinion 
Leegin was a 5-4 opinion with a dissent written by Justice Breyer. 
Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, and Justice Ginsburg joined the dissent.  
The thrust of the dissent was that intrabrand minimum price controls have 
been consistently held, and for good reason, to be a per se violation of the 
Sherman Act since 1911.178  The Leegin dissent echoes irritation as to how 
the majority dealt with the issue of stare decisis in moving past Dr. Miles 
Medical Co.179  For purposes of this article, however, the discussion is 
limited to the reasons stated in the dissent for arguing in favor of continuing 
to use the per se standard. 
The dissenting opinion distinguishes between the appropriate standard, 
acknowledging that the decision between the rule of reason and per se 
violation would be a difficult issue if the Court had been writing on a blank 
slate.180  A blank slate would occur if this were a case of first impression.181  
The Supreme Court, however, recognized the plethora of existing case law 
and the restraints of stare decisis, which in this case included nearly a 
century of established case law.182  The dissent explained that absent the 
constraints of stare decisis, there are several classical arguments for and 
against the use of a per se rule.183  The arguments focused on three sets of 
consideration, involving: (1) potential anticompetitive effects; (2) potential 
benefits; and (3) administration.184  These considerations, however, differ 
depending upon the perspective.185 
The dissent recognized that with respect to dealers, resale price main-
tenance agreements, not unlike horizontal price agreements, can diminish 
competition among dealers of a single brand or among multi-brand 
dealers.186  In doing so, the manufacturer may thwart dealers from offering 
customers the discounted prices that many customers prefer.187  Moreover, 
the dissent opined that the agreement can frustrate dealers’ efforts in 
meeting changes in demand, such as reducing prices to meet market pres-
sures.188  In addition, “they can inhibit expansion by more efficient dealers 
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whose lower prices might otherwise attract more customers,” thus oppres-
sing “the development of new, more efficient methods of retailing.”189 
With respect to producers, the dissent explained that “[r]esale price 
maintenance agreements can help reinforce the [anticompetitive] behavior” 
of businesses within a respective industry.190  In such industries, 
competitors may collude by observing each other’s pricing strategies.191  
According to the dissent, this occurs as each competitor recognizes that 
price cutting is likely to signal a price reduction by substantially all of the 
remaining competitors.192  The producer who resists the price increase will 
not benefit financially, as the dealer is prohibited from increasing “demand 
by passing along the producer’s price cut to consumers.”193 
The dissenting opinion continued with its business analysis, opining 
that most economists today concur that “resale price maintenance tends to 
produce higher consumer prices than would otherwise be the case.”194  This 
occurs as it eliminates discounters from capitalizing on economies of scale.  
Businesses that incorporate cost leadership pricing strategies generally 
minimize costs and compete on price.  When there is a minimum price, 
discounters lose their competitive advantage. 
The dissent acknowledged that although there are risks associated with 
minimum price maintenance agreements, these agreements can provide 
important consumer benefits.195  The primary advantages include enticing 
market entry and limiting free riding by capitalizing on the marketing 
efforts of other retailers.196  The dissent also conceded that when a 
manufacturer or producer seeks to impose a minimum price maintenance 
agreement, it is usually more compelling that a legitimate benefit exists, as 
opposed to when the distributors facilitate the agreement.197  “That is be-
cause, other things being equal, producers should want to encourage price 
competition among their dealers,” which generally translates into an 
increase in profits as a result of an increase in demand.198 
While the dissent indeed raised the issue of concern associated with 
minimum price controls, the dissent continually overlooked one important 
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point: the Leegin decision did not contain a ruling that all minimum price 
controls would be valid, but merely changed the method by which they 
would be evaluated for compliance with the Sherman Act.199  It is true 
Leegin means that a contract containing an intrabrand minimum price 
control will be presumed to be a valid contract clause, but the contract is 
still subject to review by the court.200  Such contract clauses will be given 
the benefit of the doubt, instead of held as a per se violation.201  Even the 
dissent acknowledged that minimum price controls could have beneficial 
consequences, with the conclusion that they are not necessarily (or, perhaps, 
per se) anticompetitive.202  The dissent’s real objection to the majority 
ruling in this case was summed up in the following: 
Economic discussion, such as the studies the Court relies upon, 
can help provide answers to these questions, and in doing so, 
economics can, and should, inform antitrust law.  But antitrust law 
cannot, and should not, precisely replicate economists’ (sometimes 
conflicting) views.  That is because law, unlike economics, is an 
administrative system the effects of which depend upon the 
content of rules and precedents only as they are applied by judges 
and juries in courts and by lawyers advising their clients.  And that 
fact means that courts will often bring their own administrative 
judgment to bear, sometimes applying rules of [per se] unlawful-
ness to business practices even when those practices sometimes 
produce benefits.203 
According to the dissent, the majority should have followed the 
doctrine of stare decisis, and should have continued to hold that minimum 
price controls are a per se violation of the Sherman Act.204  Much of the 
dissenting opinion addressed stare decisis and how the majority too easily 
overruled a nearly century old precedent.205  Is the dissent’s real objection 
over the procedural issue of how to review the law?  Is it really concerned 
with the substance behind the issue of minimum price controls and their 
effect on competition?  At best, the dissent only points out that there is not a 
unanimous agreement between economists on the effects of minimum price 
controls, as economists disagree on whether particular controls are 
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beneficial.  Furthermore, the dissent implies that although the opinions of 
economists are useful to the Court in explaining business issues, it is only 
the Court, in reliance on its own “rules and precedents,” that will know 
when a business practice adversely affects the competitive nature of the 
market place.206  While it is indeed the Court’s place to interpret and apply 
the law, it is not within the Court’s expertise to decide the true nature of 
factors in the market place.207  That is the province of business, as well as of 
the customers of business.208  Leegin merely allows a business practice, 
which even the dissent acknowledges has support among economists, to 
actually be put into practice.209  It is the marketplace that will reveal the 
effect of minimum price controls on business.210  The Court, however, will 
continue to analyze the agreement under the rule of reason to determine 
whether such controls in specific contracts violate the Sherman Act. 
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF LEEGIN 
Practicing attorneys must be cognizant that vertical price control 
agreements may now become surprisingly common as a result of Leegin.  
Such controls are not only of interest to large scale manufacturers and 
distributors, but will also prove beneficial to smaller businesses.211  Any 
business that produces or distributes products or services may have a 
legitimate interest in setting minimum price controls.  Such a business can 
include farms producing crops, livestock, animal products, as well as any 
item produced and sold in a local or regional market, or businesses engaged 
in e-commerce. 
Leegin is significant in that the United States Supreme Court has made 
it clear that vertical restraints, in particular minimum price control agree-
ments, do not constitute per se violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act.212  
Instead, such agreements must be analyzed by the trier of fact on the rule of 
reason basis.213  Only if the four factors, identified by the Court to apply the 
rule of reason, show a particular agreement to be anticompetitive, will it be 
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held to violate the Sherman Act.214  This has immediate implications on 
state legislatures and state courts, to attorneys and their clients as they 
prepare or review agreements with vertical controls, and to manufacturers, 
distributors, and retailers. 
A. STATE LEGISLATURES AND STATE COURTS 
In any state in which state law corresponds with the requirements of the 
Sherman Act, both statutes and case law will have to be reviewed and 
perhaps modified in order to discontinue the identification of vertical price 
restraints (including minimum price control agreements) as a per se viola-
tion of state anti-trust law.215  Even if state law intends to set standards that 
are more stringent than federal law, this decision may still require change.  
A mandate from the United States Supreme Court that minimum price 
control agreements are not a per se violation of the Sherman Act, or are not 
a per se violation of anti-competition laws, seems to invalidate any law to 
the contrary. 
In North Dakota, for example, anti-trust issues should be construed 
consistently with the federal interpretation.216  As a result, North Dakota 
practitioners are now permitted to incorporate most vertical price restraints 
into their contracts, which will then be reviewed under the rule of reason.217  
Such restraints will withstand judicial scrutiny if the restraints are based on 
a legitimate foundation and have procompetitive effects, such as promoting 
interbrand competition. Prior to Leegin, minimum price agreements would 
have been considered per se violations.218 
B. CONTRACTS CONTAINING VERTICAL RESTRAINTS 
So what does this mean for a manufacturer and a distributor as they sit 
down to write a contract?  There is now a formal legal acknowledgment that 
vertical price restraints can be a legitimate and enforceable term in their 
contract.219  There are, however, still limitations. The parties to such a 
contract must carefully consider the impact of their agreement on interbrand 
competition in the market place, and should also remember that their 
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agreement may only relate to intrabrand pricing.220  Producers and sellers of 
the same type of product of another brand will remain viable competitors, 
unencumbered by intrabrand pricing agreements.  The Supreme Court’s 
own factors for applying the rule of reason should be applied to the parties’ 
contract.221  As a general rule, courts will likely invalidate minimum price 
maintenance agreements in the following situations: the effect of the con-
tract is to inhibit competition; the contract results in the domination of the 
relevant market place by the contract parties; the contract results in fewer 
options with regard to the availability of the contract to customers, due to 
the subject matter of the contract; or the parties to the contract already pos-
sess significant market power.222  Leegin, however, does not stand for the 
proposition that minimum price maintenance contracts will be categorically 
upheld; contracts will be analyzed on a case by case basis instead of held as 
a per se violation.223 
C. REASONS THAT A MANUFACTURER OR PRODUCER 
WOULD BE INTERESTED IN MINIMUM PRICE CONTROL 
AGREEMENTS POST-LEEGIN 
1. The Interested Manufacturer 
It might seem that a manufacturer would determine its own costs, add 
its profit margin, and set a price for its brand.  As long as the manufac-
turer’s buyers (distributors and retailers) pay the manufacturer’s price, it 
would not seem to matter at what price the product was then sold to 
retailers or at retail.  However, the manufacturer would have an interest in 
the minimum retail price of its product, to not be set at a high price.224  If 
the price is set too high, the manufacturers of other brands of similar prod-
ucts sold at a lower price would have a competitive advantage.225  In fact, a 
distributor that sells different brands of the same product may attempt to 
eliminate competition for the cheaper brands of the product by negotiating a 
contract with the manufacturer that set a minimum price above the 
manufacturer’s competition.  This practice may be anti-competitive and 
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ultimately a violation of the law, but it may still cause damage until it is 
successfully challenged.  Manufacturers, therefore, have an interest in 
reviewing any such price control language in contracts to assure as much as 
possible that the minimum price control will not be harmful. 
2. The Interested Distributor 
Distributors may find minimum price controls advantageous on some 
products.  An investment of capital may be required to show retailers that 
the product should be purchased for resale to retail customers.226  This may 
be especially true with a new product or with new versions of an existing 
product.227  Retailers do not simply buy everything that they can; a distrib-
utor must instead market their offerings.  A contract between a manufac-
turer and distributor that requires a minimum price for a product would 
allow the distributor to determine how much it could allocate to marketing 
that product and still achieve its profit margin.228  Furthermore, since 
distributors of different brands of similar products are not covered by 
vertical price controls, this fact will be the market force influencing where 
the vertical price control is set. 
3. The Interested Retailers 
Retailers, even those who are not parties to a contract between a 
manufacturer and a distributor containing a minimum price control agree-
ment, are still affected by this decision.  If a distributor must sell a brand at 
a minimum price, a retailer buying the brand will understand that all 
retailers that buy the same brand from the same distributor will have the 
same cost.229  This requires each retailer to base their competitive advantage 
on factors other than product cost.230  Factors such as reducing a profit 
margin, and/or offering services, accessories, or other features with the 
product can stimulate competition between retailers for the sale of the 
product.231 
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V. CONCLUSION 
While the new standard permits a subjective approach in terms of 
reviewing a businesses price maintenance agreement, the United States 
Supreme Court has provided a list of plausible reasons for maintaining such 
an agreement, of which practitioners should be cognizant.  First, manufac-
turers are permitted to enter into minimum resale price maintenance agree-
ments to avoid the free riding of a discount retailer.  Secondly, the agree-
ment is more likely to withstand judicial scrutiny if it is incorporated to 
promote interbrand competition, such as rewarding competitors for invest-
ing in promotional and advertising campaigns to sell an item and enhance 
customer service.  Finally, if the minimum price maintenance agreement is 
designed to encourage entry into the market, it is probable that the 
agreement will be upheld. 
While the standard of judicial scrutiny associated with the minimum 
price maintenance agreements has been relaxed, the practitioner must 
remain cognizant that minimum price maintenance agreements will still be 
condemned under the Sherman Act if they possess anticompetitive effects.  
Moreover, the holding in Leegin is only authoritative under federal law.  
The practitioner must remain cognizant of state law when he or she 
attempts to incorporate a minimum price maintenance agreement.232 
 
 
232. Clayton & Longstaff, supra note 215, at 1090. 
